I’m currently working on a book interpreting and defending W.K. Clifford’s ethics of belief. Originally published in Victorian England in 1877, “The Ethics of Belief” articulates an enduring moral truth that it is wrong to form and maintain beliefs in the absence of evidence. Our beliefs not only underlie our actions but also bear consequences for ourselves and others, and these consequences create ethical obligations to form beliefs carefully. As Clifford emphasizes, it is irresponsible to believe whatever we please, or to adopt beliefs that are comfortable or profitable without investigating what the evidence indicates to be true. In defending Cliffordian evidentialism, this book develops new strands of historical interpretation, philosophical argumentation, and contemporary application of the ethics of belief. Sketched below are some of the lines of argument I develop in the book:
Some interpreters of Clifford emphasize the consequentialist elements of his ethics of belief, while others read him in a deontological light, and still others see elements of stoicism and Darwinism in his ethics. These differing interpretations are perplexing until we see the argument in its historical context as a multifaceted response to what T.H. Huxley calls the “dreadful consequences argufier.” In “Agnosticism and Christianity,” Clifford’s friend and colleague Huxley addresses an idea that was prominent in late nineteenth century British intellectual society: masses of people should be taught to believe in Christian religious creeds because the consequences of unbelief would be dreadful. Religious clergy claimed that it would be morally wrong not to believe in Christian creeds, despite the crumbling historical evidence for the truth of these creeds. Huxley himself criticizes the dreadful consequences argufier and defines agnosticism in terms of evidentialism, the idea defended more fully by Clifford that it is wrong to believe without evidence.
In “The Ethics of Belief,” Clifford turns the dreadful consequences argufier on its head by arguing, first, that every person has a duty to believe according to the evidence, and the consequences of failing to do so can themselves be dreadful. Secondly, Clifford suggests, it is wrong in itself to believe without evidence or to spread noble lies among the masses, even if the consequences of such beliefs appear beneficial. The duty to believe according to the evidence is akin to the duty of honesty: it is based on the value of intellectual integrity and requires fidelity to the truth. As an ethical maxim, we should not tell lies even if we are afraid that others cannot handle the truth, or even if we suspect it would be better for others to believe a lie. Such deceit and crookedness are objects of scorn, and, as Clifford writes, “Crooked ways are none the less crooked because they are meant to deceive great masses of people instead of individuals.” Like Huxley, Clifford rejects the notion that people will fall into thievery, murder, and misconduct if they discover that certain parts of ancient history are mythical: social morality does not rest on ancient mythology. Ethics has a natural basis in the survival of human communities, and communities that are to survive and thrive must nurture norms of responsible belief just as they nurture other social and moral norms.
Even as Clifford’s moral case for evidentialism draws from a plurality of intellectual traditions, it is aligned with a commitment to evidentialism in nineteenth-century utilitarianism. Decades before Clifford wrote “The Ethics of Belief,” James Mill wrote in The Westminster Review that belief without evidence is dishonest and tantamount to disregarding the good and evil of our fellow creatures, since beliefs are “the fathers of our actions” and carry consequences for our neighbors. To counteract the human tendency to ignore evidence in favor of preferred beliefs and opinions, a primary goal of education should be “to accustom the mind to run immediately from the idea of the opinion to the idea of its evidence, and to feel dissatisfaction till it is known that the evidence has been all before the mind, and fairly weighed,” Mill writes. Clifford echoes Mill’s critique of belief without evidence and works to support the utilitarian goal of educating all people to have a concern with evidence and an understanding of the latest developments in science.
This utilitarian emphasis on forming beliefs according to evidence is significant in a few respects: it provides an early account of epistemic responsibility that remains relevant today; it rightly positions a virtuous mind as the starting point of a moral life; and it challenges traditional characterizations of utilitarianism as focused exclusively on the consequences of actions. Utilitarians are often characterized as maintaining that only the consequences of actions matter; mental states such as beliefs and intentions, it is claimed, do not matter for utilitarians but figure prominently in other moral theories such as Kantianism and virtue ethics. This common characterization of utilitarianism, however, is overly simplistic and overlooks the emphasis on carefully formed, evidence-based beliefs that marked the development of utilitarianism in the nineteenth century.
One reason why Clifford’s ethics of belief is worth studying is that it addresses a phenomenon that remains prevalent in our own time: many people believe whatever they like, even on matters of fundamental importance, without due regard to what the preponderance of evidence indicates to be true or untrue; this tendency is irresponsible and harms the fabric of society. As Clifford emphasizes, all people with mature functioning minds have a responsibility to investigate the truth of their beliefs, maintain beliefs in proportion to the evidence, and resist the cognitive tendency to believe what is most convenient, comfortable, pleasurable or profitable to believe. Today an evidentialist ethics of belief helps to address social problems of science denialism, fake news, anti-vaccine activism and corporations that profit from spreading doubt among the public concerning empirical correlations between chemicals and diseases. The ethics of belief provides a normative foundation for nurturing a more epistemically responsible community, strengthening educational systems, and advancing scientific literacy and critical thinking among the public.
Andrea Veltman 