

Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender

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CHAPTER

1 Introduction

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Abstract

This chapter examines the importance of autonomy for a range of issues in contemporary ethical, political, and feminist philosophy. The authors summarize predominant conceptions of autonomy and oppression and identify several ways oppressive social practices, particularly those related to women and gender norms, can undermine ideals of personal autonomy. The chapter traces the development of recent feminist work on autonomy, providing an overview of prominent feminist criticisms of classic ideals of autonomy, accounts of relational autonomy, and recent debates over the central components and normative commitments of autonomy. The chapter also outlines the book, summarizing and connecting the main ideas of the chapters.

Keywords: Autonomy, oppression, gender, women, feminist philosophy, relational autonomy, subordination

Subject: Social and Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy

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If feminism is a response to the oppression of women, and if resistance and emancipation include living according to one's own lights, then autonomy is central to issues in feminist philosophy. Classically defined as self-determination, autonomy includes the ability to shape our own lives and to live authentically rather than being directed by external forces that manipulate or distort us.[1] Some influential accounts define autonomy as requiring a process of critical self-reflection, whereas others emphasize several agential competencies, values, or self-regarding attitudes. Still others argue that autonomy requires control over one's circumstances, a range of options that one can hope to achieve in the development of her life, and a lack of severe constraint, coercion, or subordination in which one would be subject to the dictates of others.[2] Each of these kinds of accounts of autonomy can recognize the social and relational character of human agency, and each can acknowledge that autonomous abilities can be undermined by severely oppressive social forces, for instance by stifling the development of critical intellectual faculties or by blocking life options among the oppressed.

Autonomy provides not only an emancipatory ideal for those who cope with systemic abuse, degradation, domination, or other forms of oppression but also a lens for illuminating philosophical issues surrounding women's desires, choices, and identities. Feminist philosophers working in this area ponder, for instance, whether women can freely or authentically accept conditions that support their own oppression. Should we

give credence to reflectively endorsed desires and choices that are the result of socially subordinate positions? Is the pursuit of desires that issue from patriarchal norms consistent with autonomous agency? What do we say about women who are willingly self-abnegating or wholly deferential to the interests of
p. 2 others? An analysis ↳ of autonomy serves crucially in illuminating these and related questions, informing evaluations of women who adopt symbols of gender oppression, who define themselves through unequal personal relationships, or who harm themselves or others in conforming to cultural norms.

Autonomy plays an important role not only in feminism but also, more broadly, in ethical theory, applied ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophy of education. In the area of ethical theory, it has been argued that autonomy is integral in living well—that is, that autonomy is one primary good among others that a person needs to lead a good life or to achieve human flourishing. Autonomy also supports such basic human values as dignity, respect, truthfulness, and moral responsibility: in the vein of Kant, mature and rational human beings are seen as free and responsible moral agents in virtue of our capacities to control ourselves through the exercise of our autonomous wills. In applied ethics, autonomy informs ever-bourgeoning debates on issues surrounding, for example, abortion, birth, physician-assisted suicide, and same-sex marriage. A principle of respect for autonomy also lies at the core of liberal democracies, and political philosophers often invoke autonomy in evaluating social and political principles and political power as well as in grounding individual rights or in criticizing paternalistic policies or practices. Since enhancing autonomy ranks among the most important goals of a free society, some also argue that promoting autonomy is among the most important goals of a liberal education.[3] These branches of philosophical interest in autonomy intertwine with feminist work on autonomy, as issues involving gender and oppression deeply permeate ethical and political philosophy.

Insofar as liberal democracies value individual autonomy, ideals of autonomy provide norms for critiquing oppressive practices that stifle agency and limit opportunities. If living autonomously requires an agent to have "a significant array of opportunities to act in ways that reflect what deeply matters to her," as Marilyn Friedman writes, then social conditions "should not so limit her options that she cannot choose or act for the sake of any of her deep values and commitments."[4] Oppression not only limits opportunities and life options, thus preventing an oppressed person from acting autonomously in ways that reflect her values and commitments, but also deforms desires and infects "the conditions under which growing persons are socialized."[5] Oppressive socialization can damage a person's concern for herself and stifle the development of cognitive capacities, such as those employed in self-reflection or the critical appraisal of social norms.

p. 3 Classically defined as a weighing down or as harsh dominion, oppression is characterized in contemporary feminist philosophy as structural or systemic in nature. In her landmark feminist analysis of oppression, Marilyn Frye writes that it encompasses "a system of interrelated barriers and forces which reduce, immobilize and mold people who belong to a certain group, and effect their subordination to another group."[6] Others add that oppression presents multiple faces, including marginalization, exploitation, and powerlessness, and extends beyond economic and political forces to include psychological barriers that reduce, limit, or mold people as members of certain groups.[7] Ann Cudd also clarifies that, by means of physical violence, economic domination, and psychologically coercive forces, oppression is essentially "an institutionally structured harm perpetrated on groups by other groups," in which a privileged social group benefits from the harm endured by the oppressed.[8]

Oppression can distort or damage the self-conception of an oppressed person, alienating her from her authentic self and further molding her into subordinate positions. As Sandra Bartky highlights in her work on the psychological dimensions of oppression, an oppressed person can come not only to adopt desires and values that are not her own but also to hold beliefs about herself that reflect social positions of inferiority: "to be psychologically oppressed is to be weighed down in your own mind; it is to have a harsh dominion exercised over your self-esteem."[9] The oppressed internalize a message of inferiority, as when, for instance, women are regarded by others and come to regard themselves as childlike, as cheap labor, or as

objects for the gaze or sexual pleasure of others.[10] As Michael Walzer writes in conveying another example from working life, "When a garbage-man feels stigmatized by the work he does…the stigma shows in his eyes. He enters 'into collusion with us to avoid contaminating us with his lowly self.' He looks away; and we do too. 'Our eyes do not meet. He becomes a non-person.'"[11] To feel oneself inferior or to feel oneself worthless as a person poses a threat to autonomy by undermining self-respect, which is necessary for the realization of autonomous agency on some accounts.[12]

p. 4 In thinking about autonomy and gender oppression, it is important to recognize at the start that autonomy has "long been coded masculine," as Jane Dryden writes.[13] Given historical and ideological exclusions of women from ideals of autonomy, some feminist philosophers have looked askance at conceptions of autonomy, at times rejecting the value altogether. One classic criticism, in circulation since the 1980s, is that autonomy is drawn from male biographies and bound up with socially atomistic and individualistic conceptions of human beings, such that autonomy is antithetical to the personal connections and social bonds around which many women reflectively form self-identities. In this earlier wave of feminist scholarship on autonomy, basic questions asked by philosophers concern whether autonomy requires self-sufficiency at the expense of human connections, whether women find the ideal of autonomy alienating, and whether feminine or feminist moral concerns require different conceptions of autonomy, relative to those that have been dominant in the history of philosophy or in contemporary moral and political philosophy.

This skeptical stance toward classic ideals of autonomy forms part of the starting point for work on relational conceptions of autonomy, in which feminist philosophers rehabilitate autonomy to accommodate the social character of human agency. Accounts of relational autonomy draw attention to the social, cultural, and historical contexts in which agents are embedded and to the fact that autonomy is a capability of human agents who are not only rational but also "emotional, embodied, desiring, creative and feeling."[14] Those who offer accounts of relational autonomy also analyze the effect of oppressive socialization upon human agency and underscore that autonomy should not be cast as antithetical to human connections, including those manifested in love, friendship, appropriate care, and even loyalty and devotion.

Feminist accounts of relational autonomy have now changed the landscape of autonomy studies, shifting philosophical thinking about autonomy toward the social and interpersonal dynamics that shape agency, desires, and choices.[15] Feminist scholarship has focused attention on the need for a finer and richer account of agency, and there is now a fair amount of agreement that autonomous agency is saturated with self–
p. 5 other relations. As Friedman notes, ↳ philosophical conceptions of autonomy—as opposed to conceptions of autonomy that may be culturally dominant—now seldom suggest that autonomy requires a self-sufficient or self-made person.[16] Adaptive preferences formed in the context of oppressive circumstances, such as preferences for subservience or for iconic symbols of gender oppression, also now serve as formidable potential counterexamples to purely proceduralist accounts of autonomy, which typically hold that an agent's autonomy in relation to a commitment is secured merely by the agent's endorsement of it, assuming the agent's reflection is suitably independent.

Since the publication of the landmark collection *Relational Autonomy* in 2000, feminist philosophers and autonomy scholars have continued debate over the conditions necessary for autonomous choice, the satisfactoriness of value-neutral accounts of autonomy, and the respect-worthiness of preferences formed in adaptive contexts, among other issues. For instance, in developing feminist accounts of autonomy, some theorists maintain that women who act subserviently or upon preferences formed in oppressive circumstances are not autonomous.[17] Others, however, argue that respecting the agency and deliberative capacities of oppressed women requires that we not characterize such women as "compliant dupes of patriarchy"[18] and that women living in severely oppressive conditions find outlets for the exercise of autonomy.[19] Both lines of argument initially appear plausible: as Diana Meyers observes, value-neutral accounts of autonomy, in which autonomy does not require choosing particular values, such as equality or

independence, appear attractive partly on account of showing respect for women who choose subservience or deference. On the other hand, value-saturated accounts appear attractive on account of highlighting the autonomy-subverting costs of living under oppressive systems.[20]

In *Gender in the Mirror*, Meyers notes that both value-neutral and value-saturated accounts of autonomy are troubling: value-saturated accounts appear to stigmatize some women as victims, to homogenize
p. 6 autonomous and ↳ authentic lives, and to overlook the agency women exercise even in contexts of oppressive circumstances. Yet value-neutral accounts serve poorly as tools of social critique and suffer on account of packing autonomy into purely procedural processes of reflection that effectively "neglect the possibility that a well-integrated, smoothly-functioning self could be in need of rigorous scrutiny and drastic overhaul."[21] In light of potential pitfalls of both approaches, Meyers argues that a compelling feminist account of autonomy "must acknowledge that oppression impedes autonomy without stripping women of that autonomy which they have managed to wrest from a patriarchal, racist, heterosexist, ageist, class-stratified world."[22] In her contribution to this volume, she further distinguishes ways values enter autonomy theories, demarcating new conceptual axes along which to position accounts of autonomy.

In this collection of new papers, leading scholars carry forward examinations of central theoretical and practical issues at the intersection of autonomy studies and feminist philosophy. Contributors examine fundamental components and commitments of autonomy, examining for instance the role of reflective deliberation, reasons, values, cares, emotions, self-worth, self-care, adaptive preferences, social and political commitments, and norms of independence in accounts of autonomy. Some papers pursue the question of whether autonomy is compatible with subordination, including forms of gender subordination and class-based subordination. Others examine how ideals of autonomy are affected by capitalism, political commitments to inclusivity, and feminist emphases on the relationality of human agency. In looking at autonomy amid oppression, the volume represents a plurality of perspectives about autonomy. Some contributors examine the agency of women and oppressed persons through the lens of value-neutral accounts of autonomy, whereas others utilize dialogical accounts, capabilities accounts, or thicker value-saturated accounts. Still others make meta-arguments about the merits of different kinds of approaches relative to feminist ambitions. A number of papers focus on assessing autonomy in social contexts in which agents form adaptive preferences or internalize gendered norms, and some focus on how autonomy bears in social and personal contexts of raising girls, working, pregnancy and abortion, and end-of-life decisions.

We have organized the papers in the volume into five sections, beginning with an initial cluster that explores key dimensions of the concept of autonomy, especially in regards to its relational character and associated notions of independence and freedom. In Chapter 2, Catriona Mackenzie focuses on the concept of autonomy itself. According to Mackenzie, one of the key reasons that autonomy remains a contested
p. 7 value is because philosophers have tended to ↳ view autonomy as a unitary concept. She argues that autonomy ought instead to be understood as a multidimensional concept consisting of three logically distinct but causally related dimensions: self-determination, self-governance, and self-authorization. In addition, Mackenzie provides a relational analysis of each of these dimensions of autonomy and argues that what is required to satisfy the conditions of autonomy in particular contexts will often fluctuate. The result of her work is to provide philosophers with a more nuanced understanding of autonomy, one that will allow debate on autonomy to proceed with greater clarity, precision, and sensitivity to context.

Chapter 3, by Marilyn Friedman, explores ways the concept of autonomy can combine relational and individualistic elements. Focusing on the discussion of liberal individualism in Jennifer Nedelsky's book *Law's Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law*, Friedman contends that relational and individualistic aspects of autonomy need not be irreconcilable: acknowledging the constitutive relationality of human selves is consistent with maintaining boundaries among individuals, such as occurs when the state serves to protect individuals from threats posed by one another. She argues further that the popular notion of the self-made man—valorized by some but criticized by others—is not relevant to discussions of

autonomy so much as to debates about capitalism. Freidman concludes her paper with a defense of independence as an ideal for subordinate persons: not only does an ideal of independence provide a useful goal for liberatory movements, partly because it protects against some forms of vulnerability, but it also serves a classic feminist goal of freeing women to shape their own lives rather than accepting confining definitions imposed by others.

Chapter 4, by Nancy Hirschmann, further explores the theme of independence. Hirschmann registers skepticism about relational autonomy, arguing provocatively that the concept originates from a pathology in feminine psychoanalytical development: in sexist and heteronormative practices of childrearing, girls and women emerge with relational self-identities oriented toward care and empathy that undermine the need to cultivate an independent self. She suggests that if we retain the concept of relational autonomy, then we also need a feminist concept of freedom in which a person remains an individual responsible for her own choices. Whatever desires and abilities we cultivate through relationships with others, she argues, "we need to act by and for ourselves."

The volume continues with a second cluster of papers focusing on the normative and social commitments of relational approaches to autonomy. In Chapter 5, Paul Benson contends that many of the ongoing disagreements about the normative commitments of relational autonomy can be overcome by considering the practical question of how a conception of autonomy can best advance the ethical, social, and political aims of feminism. He argues that a conception of autonomy that focuses on autonomous agents' authority
p. 8 to ↳ speak or answer to others for their choices and actions affords a preferred way to understand autonomy's relational character. Such a conception is especially congenial to advancing the practical goals of feminism, according to Benson, because it captures the importance of women's attitudes toward their own experience and because it accurately takes account of the social conditions that inform that experience. Chapter 6, by Diana Meyers, also discusses the issue of the normative commitments of autonomy. Taking as her starting point the ongoing disputes between those who defend substantive accounts of autonomy and those who defend content-neutral accounts, Meyers argues that values may be implicated in autonomy theories in two distinct ways. On one hand, an autonomy theory may prescribe or proscribe certain types of behavior or allow that any sort of behavior might be autonomously chosen; she calls this the *Directivity Axis*. On the other hand, an autonomy theory may utilize or invoke background values to elucidate the process of autonomous choice; she terms this the *Constitutivity Axis*. According to Meyers, this Double Axis Thesis has the benefit of making room for autonomy theories that are both value neutral and value utilizing. Echoing the practical concerns addressed in Benson's paper, Meyers ends her paper by arguing that value-neutral positions on the Directivity Axis serve feminist purposes well.

In Chapter 7, by contrast, Marina Oshana sees feminist purposes served well with a thicker conception of autonomy in which autonomy requires authority over certain choices, a lack of domination and exploitation in social relationships, and enough economic security to maintain control over important aspects of our lives. Without meaningful economic security, she points out, a person cannot maintain control over fundamental choices, such as choices concerning family or life partners. Broadly, Oshana also argues biconditionally that a commitment to autonomy entails a commitment to feminism and that a commitment to feminism entails a commitment to autonomy. For Oshana, respecting autonomy entails opposing forms of social domination and thus respecting autonomy entails the core demands of feminism, which mutually entails respecting the abilities of persons to make their own decisions and engage in action by means of their own authority.

A third cluster of papers in the volume attends particularly to care, emotion, and reason in accounts of autonomy and challenges certain influential notions about autonomy. In Chapter 8, Christine Tappolet rebuts a notion found in both historical and contemporary philosophical sources that emotional agents (and by extension women) cannot be autonomous. She draws on an account of emotions she develops elsewhere to show not only that emotions are integral in autonomous agency but also that emotions and reason-

responsiveness are not at odds. In addition to dismantling a ludicrous argument that women cannot be autonomous, Tappolet's paper thus constitutes a powerful challenge to autonomy accounts that are predominantly rationalistic in character. This paper dovetails with our ninth chapter by Andrea Westlund,
p. 9 who argues that ↳ autonomy requires an attitude of self-care, which involves taking care with one's reasons and decisions as well as taking responsibility for one's judgments. Clarifying distinct conceptions of care at play in the philosophical literature, she utilizes a finessed conception of care to augment answerability accounts of autonomy, which, for Westlund, involve maintaining an open-minded disposition to explain one's reasons and cares and to engage in potentially self-transformative deliberation with others. Westlund sees the relational character of autonomy as being at least partially grounded in the autonomous agent's attitude of self-care: it is precisely the autonomous agent's attitude of care for her self that leads her to take seriously reflective deliberation with qualified others about reasons for action.

The fourth cluster of papers in the volume engages with issues surrounding the relation among autonomy, oppression, and adaptive preferences. In Chapter 10, John Christman addresses the question of how to distinguish between (1) cases in which agents respond to changing life circumstances while retaining their autonomy and (2) cases in which agents adapt to new circumstances in an autonomy-undermining way. He examines this distinction by considering not only different sources of serious life constraints, including human trafficking and paralysis through disability, but also different judgments about these constraints that can be supported with various accounts of autonomy. He argues ultimately that a proceduralist account of autonomy is best able to account for the difference between self-governing adaptation and loss of agency in response to oppressive constraints. In so doing he refines the procedural account of autonomy developed in his earlier work, incorporating a new condition he calls reflexive self-affirmation.

Chapter 11, by Natalie Stoljar, continues a focus on autonomy and adaptation to oppressive social circumstances. Tackling the claim that some philosophers have made that desires formed under oppressive circumstances are deformed and hence autonomy undermining, Stoljar defends a two-sided thesis. On one hand, she argues that adaptive preferences *per se* are not incompatible with autonomy. Yet on the other hand, she contends that many of the cases of adaptive preference formation of concern to feminists are autonomy undermining insofar as they fail to satisfy criteria contained in both proceduralist and substantive theories of autonomy. Like that of Christman, Stoljar's discussion offers both an illuminating analysis of preferences formed in oppressive contexts and a substantive engagement with the important recent work of feminist philosopher Serene Khader.

A final fifth cluster of papers deals with autonomy as it relates to particular social and personal contexts. In Chapter 12, Mark Piper raises the question of how parents ought to gender socialize their daughters, given a commitment both to feminism and to enhancement of the development of daughters' future autonomy. He joins other feminist theorists in observing that traditional female gender socialization tends to subvert the
p. 10 autonomy of women, such as by ↳ teaching girls to favor subordinate roles or by undermining girls' confidence in themselves. In light of a need for alternative forms of gender socialization, Piper examines a variety of forms of gender socialization in light of commitments to autonomy and feminism, ultimately favoring an inclusive form of feminist gender socialization that retains a positive valuation of the category of womanhood.

Whereas Piper addresses the impact that parents and others can have on the development of autonomy in girls and women, Andrea Veltman, in Chapter 13, turns attention to the impact that work can have on the development and exercise of autonomous capabilities. Drawing on empirical and philosophical literatures on work and well-being, she argues that working extensively at eudemonistically meaningless work undermines autonomy and self-respect and that promoting autonomous agency entails respecting the agency and skills people exercise at work. In part, Veltman also examines autonomy in relation to economic independence, writing in agreement with Friedman, Oshana, and others that economic independence is a condition of personal autonomy that women have good reason to seek. Although some feminist theorists

highlight morally problematic implications of a social ethos of economic independence (particularly for women whose need to raise young children renders ideals of independence and self-sufficiency unattainable), Veltman says that an appreciable dimension of the oppression of many women workers is that they labor extensively at jobs that do not enable a meaningful measure of financial independence.

A final pairing of papers in our fifth cluster examines autonomy and embodiment with attention to pregnancy, abortion, disability, and physician-assisted suicide. Chapter 14, by Anita Superson, concerns the place of a right to bodily autonomy in relation to the abortion controversy. Drawing centrally on the work of Judith Jarvis Thomson,[23] Superson argues that the right to bodily autonomy is even stronger than Thomson supposed, and she underwrites powerful arguments in favor of women's right to abortion. Although focusing the majority of her essay on the abortion debate, Superson concludes by noting that the right to bodily autonomy has crucial normative weight in many other debates that are of importance to women, including rape, female genital manipulation, and woman battering. Finally, in Chapter 15, Anita Ho discusses the influence of ableist social ideology on the autonomy of those facing end-of-life decisions. According to Ho, even if the influence of ableist social ideology is not directly coercive, it can inform people's deliberations about their alternatives in an autonomy-undermining way. The upshot of her work is
p. 11 a call for greater attention to the broader societal assumptions about the value ↳ of life with impairments and an appreciation of how these assumptions may negatively affect people's quality of life, the autonomy of their decision-making processes, and their end-of-life decisions.

This collection is a collaborative endeavor, and we would like to express our sincere thanks to all our contributing authors, who have been a pleasure to work with and whose papers we are proud to bring together in this volume. We especially thank Natalie Stoljar and Catronia Mackenzie for supporting this collection by organizing a workshop called Relational Autonomy: Ten Years On, at which our contributors had an invaluable opportunity to present and discuss drafts of papers for the volume. We would also like to thank the Department of Philosophy and Religion at James Madison University for supporting our work on the project and our research assistant, Sara Scherer, for assistance in helping us prepare and streamline the collection. Thanks also to our acquisitions editor at Oxford University Press, Lucy Randall, for her support and assistance with the project from its inception and to the anonymous reviewers of our book project for valuable recommendations for the project. We hope that readers of this volume will benefit from the efforts
p. 12 of all who have contributed and will find the papers as important and as richly stimulating as we do. ↳

Notes

1 As characterized by John Christman, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, August 2009.

2 Marina Oshana, "Personal Autonomy in Society," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 29:1 (Spring 1998): 81-102 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1998.tb00098.x ; Oshana, *Personal Autonomy in Society* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006).

3 For more on the importance of autonomy in normative philosophy, see Mark Piper, "Autonomy: Normative," in the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, December 2010.

4 Marilyn Friedman, *Autonomy, Gender, Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 10.1093/0195138503.001.0001 , 18.

5 Friedman, *Autonomy, Gender, Politics*, 19.

6 Marilyn Frye, *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory* (Freedom, CA: Crossing Press, 193), 33.

7 Sandra Bartky, "On Psychological Oppression" and Iris Marion Young, "Five Faces of Oppression" reprinted in *Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology*, edited by Ann Cudd and Robin Andreasen (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).

8 Ann Cudd, *Analyzing Oppression* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 10.1093/0195187431.001.0001 , 26, cf. 23–27.

9 Bartky, "On Psychological Oppression," 105.

10 Bartky, "On Psychological Oppression," 106, 112.

11 Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 176. Walzer here

cites Stewart E. Perry's *San Francisco Scavengers: Dirty Work and the Pride of Ownership* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 7.

12 As Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth write, practices that confer denigration or humiliation threaten "self-esteem by making it much harder (and, in limit cases, even impossible) to think of oneself as worthwhile. The resulting feelings of shame and worthlessness threaten one's sense that there is point to one's undertakings. And without that sense of one's aspirations being worth pursuing, one's agency is hampered." Anderson and Honneth, "Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition and Justice," in *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays*, edited by John Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 131 10.1017/CBO9780511610325 .

13 Jane Dryden, "Autonomy: Overview," in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, November 2010.

14 Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, "Introduction: Autonomy Refigured," in *Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self*, edited by Mackenzie and Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21; Natalie Stoljar, "Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Summer 2013.

15 See, e.g., John Christman, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy."

16 Marilyn Friedman, "Autonomy, Social Disruption and Women," in *The Feminist Philosophy Reader*, edited by Alison Bailey and Chris Cuomo (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008). See also Friedman's chapter "Relational Autonomy and Independence" in this volume.

17 Natalie Stoljar, "Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition," in Mackenzie and Stoljar, *Relational Autonomy*.

18 Uma Narayan, "Minds of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural Practices and Other Women," in *A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).

19 John Christman, "Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Construction of Selves," *Philosophical Studies* 117 (2004): 143–164 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000014532.56866.5c ; Andrea Westlund, "Rethinking Relational Autonomy," *Hypatia* 24 (2009): 26–49 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01056.x ; Serene J. Khader, *Adaptive Preferences and Women's Empowerment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199777884.001.0001 .

20 Diana Tietjens Meyers, *Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women's Agency* (New York: Oxford University Press 2002) 10.1093/0195140419.001.0001 , 11.

21 Meyers, *Gender in the Mirror*, 16.

22 Meyers, *Gender in the Mirror*, 16.

23 Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1:1 (Autumn 1971): 47–66.