Articles

“Hannah Arendt on Labor, Work and Action,” forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Work, edited by Julian Jonker and Grant Rozeboom.

Hannah Arendt opens The Human Condition with a claim I find fundamentally correct: labor and work are among the conditions under which life has been given to humanity. This claim is more apt than claiming that labor is the essence of humanity, and it is more realistic than dreaming that labor and work can be eliminated from human life. As a whole, this chapter examines and evaluates Arendt’s distinction among labor, work, and action. This trifold distinction illuminates genuine differences among human activities that maintain life, build an enduring world, and express human individuality in public speech and deeds. However, Arendt’s distinction is porous and open to criticism, and this chapter contains an argument that Arendt fails to capture the full range of meaningfulness in labor and work. Nevertheless, her account of labor and work remains insightful and provides a healthy dose of skepticism in response to prognostications of a post-work society.

“Autonomy and Work” in the Routledge Handbook of Autonomy, edited by Ben Colburn (Routledge, 2023), pp. 392-401.

This essay examines autonomy in relation to work, distinguishing (1) an autonomous choice of work from (2) autonomy as independence achieved through work and from (3) autonomy exercised within work. I first consider what constitutes an autonomous choice of work and whether most work in the world should be classed as heteronomous. In section I, I argue that critical discussions over universal basic income bring to light a lack of autonomy many people have in relation to work. Section II differentiates personal autonomy from economic independence, finding that economic independence promotes personal autonomy. Section III examines how daily activities within work can support or stifle autonomous capabilities. Since the work we do affects our autonomous capabilities, we cannot show due respect for worker autonomy solely by genuflecting at individual choices of employment; we should also consider whether the work itself affords opportunities for autonomous agency.

“Skilled work and ethics: how can we expand opportunities for meaningful work?” in A Research Agenda for Skills and Inequality, edited by Michael Tahlin (Edward Elger Publishing, 2023), pp. 305-318.

This chapter addresses questions of social philosophy that arise once we see that meaningful work is central in human flourishing: in a just society, is meaningful work available for all people? Who should do the necessary work that undermines the well-being of the workers? And how can we expand opportunities for meaningful work for more people? This chapter is partly a meditation on the merits and limits of sharing routine work, which provides a partial solution to unhappy moral problems created by occupations of routine work. We have no complete solution to such problems, and we should acknowledge that work that allows us to thrive is a limited good.

“Leisure and Respect for Working People” in The Politics and Ethics of Contemporary Work, edited by Keith Breen and Jean-Philippe Deranty (Routledge, 2021), pp. 59-71.

What does it mean to respect working people? In this essay, I explore this question and argue that respecting working people entails, in part, providing ample leisure that allows working people to flourish. Providing leisure issues from respecting people for at least two reasons: first, respecting people means not treating people merely as tools or as means to profit or productivity, and without ample leisure, working people lack sufficient time and energy for their own well-being, their energies instead consumed in service to others. Second, respecting working people means caring for their development as human beings, and this development does not occur without time away from work, time for oneself, time for reflection and for the development of intelligence and abilities. Leisure in the classical sense of scholé, I suggest, should be a good for all people, rather than a good reserved for an elite class of intellectuals.

“Universal Basic Income and the Good of Work” in The Future of Work, Technology, and Basic Income, edited by Michael Cholbi and Michael Weber (Routledge, 2020), pp. 131-150.

This chapter examines proposals for a universal basic income, which promise to improve conditions of life, especially for those who are vulnerable to harms of poverty and oppression in nations that are advanced in productivity and wealth. The author argues that two primary points of opposition to a universal basic income – that there is a social obligation to work and that a universal basic income would undermine motivation to work – are fairly weak counterarguments to basic income schemes. The benefits of work are plentiful, and people have ample reason for working, even with the real freedom of a basic income. The author also considers the problem of bad work: who will do the heteronomous work in a society in which all people enjoy an income sufficient for subsistence? I suggest the problem of bad work goes beyond the provision of basic income but has a handful of potential solutions.

“What Makes Work Meaningful?” in The Philosophers’ Magazine 81:2 (2018): 78-83.

Written for a general philosophical audience, this brief essay identifies four ways in which work can be meaningful for the person who performs it. Briefly, work can be meaningful when it develops and exercises capabilities, skills and talents of workers, when it supports virtues such as pride, honor and dignity, when it produces something useful or purposeful, or when it integrates elements of a worker’s life, such as by building or reflecting personal relationships. Meaningful work is a wonderfully complex concept, and there is no singular defining feature of meaningful work.

“Meaningful Work” in the Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics, edited by D. Poff and A. Michalos (Springer, 2017).

Drawn from my book on meaningful work, this entry on meaningful work characterizes meaningful work as both a multidimensional concept and an integral part of a happy life. In addition to describing the ways in which work can be meaningful, this entry summarizes a debate in the philosophical literature concerning whether there is a right to meaningful work and, relatedly, whether there is a duty on the part of businesses and other employing organizations to provide meaningful work to employees.

“Is Meaningful Work Available to All People?” in Philosophy and Social Criticism 41:7 (2015), pp. 725-747.

In light of the impact of work on human flourishing, an intractable problem for political theorists concerns the distribution of meaningful work in a community of moral equals. This article reviews a number of partial solutions that a well-ordered society could draw upon to provide equality of opportunity for meaningful work and to minimize the impact of bad work upon those who perform it. Even in view of these solutions, however, it is not likely that opportunities for meaningful work can be guaranteed for all people, which carries an implication that, even in well-ordered societies, it is likely that not all people will flourish. The author argues that the limitedness of meaningful work is not a reason to reject the normative claim that meaningful work is integral in flourishing, nor is it a reason against working to transform social and political institutions to increase opportunities for meaningful work.

“Autonomy and Oppression at Work” in Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender, edited by Andrea Veltman and Mark Piper (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 280-300.

This chapter of Autonomy, Oppression and Gender focuses attention on the impact that work has on autonomy and self-respect. Drawing on empirical and philosophical literatures on work and well-being, I argue that working extensively at heteronomous work undermines autonomy and self-respect. By contrast, promoting autonomy entails respecting the agency and skills that people can exercise at work. This chapter also examines dehumanization at work and applies principles of Kantian ethics to oppose exploitative work and support the opportunities for meaningful work.

“Introduction” in Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender, edited by Veltman and Piper (Oxford University Press, 2014), co-authored with Mark Piper, 1 – 11.

This chapter examines the importance of autonomy for a range of issues in contemporary ethical, political, and feminist philosophy. The authors summarize predominant conceptions of autonomy and oppression in the philosophical literature and identify several ways oppressive social practices, particularly those related to women and gender norms, can undermine ideals of personal autonomy. The chapter traces the development of recent feminist work on autonomy, providing an overview of prominent feminist criticisms of classic ideals of autonomy, accounts of relational autonomy, and recent debates over the central components and normative commitments of autonomy. The chapter also outlines the book, summarizing and connecting the main ideas of the chapters.

Review of The Promise of Happiness by Sara Ahmed in Hypatia 28:1 (2013): 218-222.

“Simone de Beauvoir and Hannah Arendt on Labor” in Hypatia 25:1 (2010): pp. 55-78.

Comparing the typologies of human activities developed by Beauvoir and Arendt, I argue in this essay that these philosophers share the same concept of labor as well as a similar insight that labor cannot provide a justification or evaluative measure for human life. But Beauvoir and Arendt think differently about work as contrasted with labor, and Arendt alone illuminates the inability of constructive work to provide non-utilitarian value for human existence. Beauvoir, on the other hand, exceeds Arendt in examining the ethical implications of our existential need for a plurality of free peers in a public realm.

“Introduction” in Oppression and Moral Agency: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card, Special Issue of Hypatia 24:1 (2009), edited by Andrea Veltman and Kathryn Norlock, co-authored with Kathryn Norlock, 3-8.

This essay provides a context for a collection of philosophical essays written in honor of Claudia Card. The authors sketch themes of oppression and moral agency in Card’s work, with special attention to the concept of moral luck. The authors also summarize and compare the essays in the volume.

“Introduction” in Evil, Political Violence, and Forgiveness: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card, edited by Andrea Veltman and Kathryn Norlock (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), co-authored with Kathryn Norlock, 1-11.

This essay provides a context for a second collection of philosophical essays written in honor of Claudia card. The authors summarize Card’s theory of evil, in which evils are intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing, and discuss applications of her theory to collectively perpetrated evils such as genocide and slavery. The authors also summarize and compare the essays in the volume.

“The Concept of Transcendence in Beauvoir and Sartre” in Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of Influence, edited by Christine Daigle and Jacob Golomb (Indiana University Press, 2008), 222-240.

Scholars of twentieth-century French existentialism have traditionally assumed that Simone de Beauvoir borrows her concept of transcendence from Sartre. In this chapter, I work to demonstrate that Beauvoir develops her concept of transcendence independently of Sartre, with the result that the two have different notions of transcendence. In her early ethical treatise Pyrrhus and Cinéas, Beauvoir develops a sense of transcendence as constructive activity in the world, arguing that only transcendent activity can provide meaning for human existence. Not only does her concept of transcendence differ significantly from Sartre’s metaphysical concept of transcendence in Being and Nothingness, but Beauvoir also develops this concept of transcendence with reference to a host of writers in Western literature and philosophy rather than with reference to Sartre.

“Transcendence and Immanence in the Ethics of Simone de Beauvoir” in The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Critical Essays, edited by Margaret Simons (Indiana University Press, 2006), 113-131.

Beauvoir’s use of the Hegelian dichotomy between transcendence and immanence has been a primary target in feminist critiques of The Second Sex since the 1970s, when feminist theorists celebrating women’s difference began criticizing Beauvoir for developing a vision of the liberated woman as one who surpasses feminine immanence to achieve masculine transcendence. Even today, some feminist philosophers and Beauvoir scholars continue to view the dichotomy as an outmoded and masculinist remnant of Sartrean metaphysics. Against this grain of criticism, I argue that Beauvoir’s concepts of transcendence and immanence are neither outmoded nor masculinist nor classist. To the contrary, a Beauvoirian feminism rooted in a normative distinction between transcendence and immanence has the advantage of drawing attention to gendered inequities in divisions of labor at time when equitable divisions of labor cannot be taken for granted.

Review of The Other Within: Ethics, Politics and the Body in Simone de Beauvoir by F. Scarth in Hypatia 21:3 (2006): 217-221.

“The Justice of the Ordinary Citizen in Plato’s Republic” in Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 22:1 (2005): 45-59.

On the surface, it is not clear whether the ordinary citizen in Plato’s Republic possesses the virtue of justice defended in the dialogue. In order to resolve a tension in Plato’s treatment of the ordinary citizen, this paper presents a distinction between the civic justice of the ordinary citizen and the platonic justice of the philosopher. Whereas the justice possessed by the philosopher requires knowledge of the good as well as a reason-governed soul, civic justice requires only true beliefs about justice and a habit or practice of just action.

“The Sisyphean Torture of Housework” in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 19:3 (2004): 121-143.

This paper examines Simone de Beauvoir’s account of marriage in The Second Sex and argues that Beauvoir’s dichotomy between transcendence and immanence can provide an illuminating critique of continuing gender inequities in marriage and divisions of domestic work.

“Aristotle and Kant on Self-Disclosure in Friendship” in The Journal of Value Inquiry 38:3 (2004): 225-239.

Reprinted in revised form in Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship, edited by S. Stern-Gillet and G. Gurtler (SUNY, 2014) and in Sex, Love and Friendship, edited by A. McEvoy (Brill, 2011).

Among the common elements in the accounts of friendship offered by Aristotle and Kant is the notion that the highest form of friendship makes possible a mutual knowing of another person. In revealing themselves to a trusted friend, people in the highest friendships become known by another person, thereby connected to another person, and no longer remain alone. The author argues that Aristotle and Kant emphasize complimentary aspects of the mutual knowing involved in friendship, but Kant gives a comparatively more attractive account of self-disclosure as an inherently valuable activity. At the same time, Aristotle’s account of friendship as a whole is more developed and more firmly grounded in human sociability than Kant’s account of friendship.